Q&A about the conference on pre-revolutionary Iranian thought

Q&A about the conference on pre-revolutionary Iranian thought

Screenshot from the seminar (source: YouTube)

Vladimir Mitev responds to colleagues from the Centre for Middle East and Mediterranean Studies at Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca

In the second part of the conference “Social and anti-colonial motives in pre-revolutionary Iranian thought” Vladimir Mitev answered questions about relations between West and East, possible academic collaborations and the rift between the worlds, as well as the significance of Ahmad Fardid and Jalal Al-e Ahmad’s thought today.

Watch the second part with subtitles in English here:

Marius Lazar: Perfect. Thank you, Vladimir. It was absolutely fascinating and very rich and full of your presentation. I was a bit mesmerized. And I was impressed because it was a very fluid presentation.

Before we kicked off our talk, having discussed it beforehand, Vladimir asked me if it was a problem that he didn’t have a presentation, PowerPoint or whatever. I replied no way, no need because you discuss ideas. Which is what happened.

And you yourself are not only Bulgarian, not only Romanianized, but to a very large extent, I think you are also Iranianized. I think that’s a virtue, absolutely, but what I notice, somehow, is that your Islamization is not going in directions that are not always very agreeable in the Iranian spirit and nature. So you’ve caught the good side of Iranian authenticity, so to speak, and now listening to you, making all these absolutely fascinating connections and I really enjoy it.

It’s a presentation that I enjoyed enormously, and I say that very sincerely and listening to you and reflecting on what you said, with all these, how shall I say, travesties of Iranian intellectual thinkers to find solutions. I realized, it could probably be an impression. Perhaps you know better, those of you who work more seriously and more thoroughly on Iranian thought or Iranian culture, that to a very great extent perhaps all these attempts to find their identity, their path, their originality, their authenticity – that we are all in the spirit of Heidegger’s existentialist thought – somehow all these are really just expressions of this Iranian arrogance to consider themselves different, superior, different, intangible somehow in a kind of Iranian essentialism that is its own, authentic, that must not allow itself to be intoxicated, or I don’t know what to call it, westernized by all these external influences and, to a very large extent, this kind of reflection, which obviously your approach is part of or fits very well into the wider circuit of reflections on what is called postcolonialism in the broadest sense. Many cultures that have suffered from this Western tutelage, influence and domination, and in the case of India as well (you spoke very nicely about Gandhi), and in South-East Asia, Indonesia and Africa as well, there are countless reflections and identity searches by the people there, trying somehow to get out of what was their stage or period, or their period subject to Western modernity.

Iran too, since the 19th century, has suffered massive political and military, economic and intellectual pressure from the West. Russia to the north, Britain to the south in the Persian Gulf. There is a whole epic of this Iranian interaction with the West. Or of Iranian stances towards the West. Already in the Qajar period, Shia theologians, especially those involved in the 1905 constitutionalist revolution, had this ambiguity of relationship in relation to this modernity. They wanted to take over from the West elements of political culture or, in a broader sense, of Western modernity – parliamentarianism, constitutionalism, for example, themes that were not necessarily specific to traditional Islamic culture. But at the same time all these assimilations were thought out in a logic of their own to adapt them to an Iranian specificity and authenticity. So we are talking about a long history of this relationship with the West. And this was somehow the idea, which I probably don’t know how authentic it is, that, to a very large extent, these attempts to redefine their own identity are part of this Iranian spirit of considering themselves, if I may use a very classic expression, the center of the universe. And the return to Persian mysticism, to Islam, all of this is part of this dynamic. This trajectory, this trajectory of rediscovering a difference from the West. Any questions? Viviana.

Viviana Movileanu: I was very attentive to the presentation. I simply wanted to praise the West because I listened to the lecture. The European construction stands on pillars which are, in fact, our universities. I mean all the European construction, all the funds that come – the structural ones, they actually address those dysfunctions that arise between the different education systems that are found, since the 12th century, on the European continent. There are two models – the Nordic and the southern Mediterranean. Anyway, it’s a long story: the history of European universities is very interesting, but in this idea, I am now trying to make a eulogy to the West. I want to say that the University of Cluj is a pillar on which European construction stands. The University of Bucharest is another pillar on which European construction stands. The University of Sofia is also the pillar on which European integration is based. We must somehow understand this and not go against the origin. So we cannot exist without these schools, and the problems that arise that I don’t understand why Iranians don’t understand in these schools – the corruption within these systems that are dysfunctional, but they are dysfunctional, they are not connected to each other, well, there are structural funds that are trying to solve these problems. They come up, they’re not discussed transparently, and there’s a wrong image of the West in the East, that’s what I see, especially as I’m specifically dealing with structural funds and European construction. I come from the other side, I am in opposition to the lecture.

Marius Lazăr: I can say that there is an enormous amount of criticism, a lot of criticism from non-European worlds is the product, let’s say, of Western influences. There is no doubt about it, and it is about other institutions and political, economic, ideological practices – the idea of the nation state and so on. That’s not the problem, that the West wouldn’t have played a role. The issue is not necessarily whether the West was good or bad for Iran or Iraq or Egypt or Morocco or Algeria. All these discussions that take place in the Iranian space are found in the narratives of nationalist, or not just nationalist, elites. All these states are generically designated, let’s say, post-colonial. Although perhaps not all of them were colonies in the classical sense of the term. Iran was not a colony, but instead had a very present Western influence, but more importantly what probably bothered Iranians a lot, not so much that the West entered Iran, but more importantly that the elites who ruled Persia – the Pahlavis as well as the Qajars before them… the later Qajars were fascinated by Western technological, scientific and cultural modernity and copied a very avid…

The problem is that their own elites distanced themselves from Iranian authenticity and somehow betrayed the spirit of Iranian authenticity, even though Shah Reza Khan and the late Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi himself was in the logic of building an Iranian superitivity, an Iranian specificity. In 1971, when the great events of Persepolis took place, when the 2500th anniversary of the Persian Empire was celebrated, he himself tried, as Vladimir said, the Shah had enormous geopolitical, military and economic ambitions linked to the destiny of Iran. How can I put it, although Iran had no real potential to generate this kind of ambition which was not even ideological, but it was an ambition of grandeur. Chess itself used Iran’s whole system as a kind of springboard for its own ambition of grandeur and greatness. So it’s a paradigm somehow of the Iranian mentality. And it’s not by chance that Iranians empathized very much with the Germans, with Germany in the 20th century. Germany had this kind of fascination, they projected grandeur onto their idea of Europe. Germany über alles. In the same way Iranians could say Persia über alles, that is Persia above all. All these intellectuals, whom, I’m sorry, I don’t know very well. Unfortunately, I haven’t had time to devote myself to them, but I have an intuition, as I said, they themselves are, they probably see themselves as an expression of these attempts to rediscover an Iranian grandeur on a cultural, intellectual level. I mean Iran not to be so much intoxicated by something that is not authentically Iranian. Vladimir. After all, you have to speak.

Vladimir Mitev: If I may just briefly. Forgive me I don’t know what I’m touching on Zoom. I hope I’ll sort it out. Anyway, we need to define very precisely what we mean by criticism of the West, what we mean by the term ,,West”, what we mean by Iran. Because, for example, in Rouhani’s time, you probably know that Iran had more ministers with PhDs earned in the US than the US government. And this was written in the American press. So it’s not fake news. Basically Iran had so many people educated in the West or in the US,that at one point when they wanted to make an opening to the same evil or the West, they appointed in the government a lot of Western educated cadres. And that was a sign, probably. These people have their contacts and so on.

I probably didn’t explain it well. When these things are discussed, I try to discuss them by being informed and knowledgeable. So I’m not necessarily saying that I’m making a criticism of the West or a criticism of Iran. I find it interesting that there seems to be this sense of betrayal. I find it interesting to study because this meaning appears several times in our area. And so I try to draw some parallels.

Of course, without being my definitive opinion, I try more to study and learn. Thanks for the critique. If I understand it correctly, we have some foundations to build on. Of course, we have to know very well what we are basing ourselves on, because I, for example, just today sent an article to a journal in Romania in which I discuss, in fact, the European intellectual influence on these authors I have just spoken about. In my opinion, this influence is very strong and I suggested that the idea of the complete human being is a Heideggerian idea. Basically, thanks to this study that I am doing, I have also got to know some of the Western European intellectual thoughts and I am very happy about that. Because I’m surprised how little we actually read in Bulgaria and how little we know about the European area, for example, not just Iran.

Ion Josan: I don’t know how it seems to you. I think that Vladimir also, paradoxically, the fact that all the time these intellectuals are talking about authenticity, they are trying to somehow get closer to a lost Iranian or Islamic, lost Muslim soul and they all pass all this desire to return to some authentic forms through a language that leads very much to Europe, to European philosophers. After all, we talk about authenticity, but we get lost in this language of European philosophy, not his way of relating to existence, which is European after all, and then I don’t know, Al-e Ahmad seems to me more like a thinker who lives, who lives ideologically in a world of European ideas and too little in the environment of ancient Persian philosophy, in authentic quotes. After all, how do you see it? How you can recover authenticity by living more in the European ideational space.

Vladimir Mitev: It’s a detail that Al-e Ahmad also wrote some travel diaries, and apart from the fact that he was in the US at the invitation of Mr. Kissinger, which we know about today, or that he was in Moscow as well, as far as I know, he was also in Israel at the invitation of the Israeli government and made the pilgrimage to Mecca. And after every such significant trip, he came out with a text. My problem, at least to give a very good answer, is that I don’t know the texts related to Israel and Saudi Arabia very well. I know in general, for example, the idea that Saudi is all about the masses, so I really think that’s what it’s called, Lost in the Crowd in English – I think that’s how this travelogue was translated. It seems to me that Al-e Ahmad really did a kind of engaged literature, or how shall I put it, he lived what he thought. He had some research. You know he came from a religious family, but he didn’t follow his father’s plans and he lived a secularized life for a very long time, and he was also linked to the Communist Party and then the Third Force Movement which was pro-Mossadegh but anti-Soviet. And at the end of his life, seemingly discovering the potential of Islam to change one’s society, he came to these journeys. In Mecca he seemed to develop his ideas further. Several people even say there is no authenticity. Basically there is a kind of setting, for example, in which you act with determination, you act carefully, you are attentive so you are engaged – these things characterise an authentic approach to life. But it’s harder to imagine anyone being authentic and anything being authentic in a cultural sense. And I rather if I’m talking about authenticity or this revival of tradition, that’s because, in my opinion, this trauma that I mentioned, existed and I see that the protagonists are sincere. I don’t see them as anti-Western or anti-Western, anti-Eastern or anti-Orthodox. Simply, in their culture, in their borders – in their selves, if you will – they were looking for a solution to the trauma. They had to attack it somehow, and it seems to me that we, not being in Iran and not being initiated into Iranian contradictions, when we hear some words we take them very literally. Maybe I am wrong. Of course there are many opinions. One opinion would be that it is an internal renegotiation in Iran and that’s why they needed mobilization and tradition, and Islam or Marxism provided mobilization in hard times before the Islamic revolution. And after the revolution there are different mobilizations. We see that in 2009 there was a mobilization, it seems, of some Iranian NGOs or middle class.

I didn’t really say that, but these days I tried to interview a lady. I didn’t succeed, but she is the translator of the novel The Morning After, which has recently been translated into English, and of a novel which is somehow the opposite of this proletarian trend I’m talking about today. It’s written, I think, in 1995, and quickly translated even into German. It’s a novel that shows that progressivism today is with the middle class, it’s no longer with the workers or the oppressed, as it was thought to be before the Revolution. But today is already a different time. So society has changed. I don’t know if I’ve answered that well, I hope it’s helpful.

Marius Lazar: Dragos.

Dragos Becheru: I would be curious to what extent do we have, as in the novel Uncle Napoleon, elements of Russophobia in the writings of Iranian authors? If they are fighting against the Russian cultural currents that we know had an influence at least initially on Iran, or if it is subsumed by Western culture until the Bolshevik revolution and after that the internationalist left can no longer be considered Western.

Vladimir Mitev: I too have asked this question to some people I know in Iran, because reading about anti-colonialism, Britain always comes to the fore. And they told me that there are authors who are also somewhat skeptical of Russia. But I know less about what they’re currently writing. What I can say from my experience. I had the opportunity to be in Iran once, in 2004 and in Shiraz, in the southern area that was occupied by the British. I wanted to buy a book by Edward Browne, who you may know is a British Iranologist and a supporter of the Constitutional Revolution in the early 20th century. And even in Tehran there is an avenue apparently named after Edward Browne, and the gentleman who was selling me the book said it was very anti-Russian. Because Russia took Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan from Iran and they are genuine Iranian lands. I can’t give a good example of literature critical of the Soviet Union at the moment. And it seems to me that one cause is, as my acquaintances have said, that the British influence was seen as tougher or stronger, or a big problem. And now I even know of some memes that keep suggesting that Iran is anti-colonial, but not in the anti-Soviet or anti-Russian sense. I don’t know if the answer is what you’re interested in.

Viviana Movileanu: It’s a very interesting discussion. It’s an exceptional observation. Yes, it is extraordinary.

Marius Lazar: Cristina, do you have any questions or comments?

Cristina Ciovarnache: I don’t. I have no questions. I’m listening.

Marius Lazăr: You are the specialist among us.

Cristina Ciovarnache: I’m not a specialist, I said. I’m a translator, not a specialist.

Marius Lazăr: But a specialist translator.

Cristina Ciovarnache: I have no questions.

Marius Lazăr: Ion. Then you. I know you had much more connection with the topics discussed today by Vladimir.

Ion Josan: I don’t know. I wonder to what extent Al-e Ahmad is still relevant for at least the generation of young Iranians

Marius Lazar: That’s exactly what I wanted to ask Vladimir. What is the reception today of this generation, let’s say the golden generation, of the new Iranian thought of the 60s and 70s?

Vladimir Mitev: I know an Iranian intellectual my age, so a little under 40, who is strongly fascinated by Al-e Ahmad. He sees him as a living Iranian spirit. And sometimes he sends me some old YouTube videos. In which Al-e Ahmad was talking about something. I don’t know what exactly, I can’t remember. I don’t know what exactly young people think, but of course there is this opinion that he was somehow contradictory. He couldn’t find peace as a person and that’s probably something dialectical, I would translate into European language or European thinking. I remember a well-known philosopher from my student years who had the expression, when we were discussing some people or thinkers, I would say “there’s something going on there”. That’s how he talked about people in whose internal life, let’s say, nothing happens, and people where something happens, and Al-e Ahmad seems to be a person where something happens.

I can recommend if you want a reading in English. Hamid Dabashi published just last year, I think, a book about Al-e Ahmad. I read it halfway through and it’s interesting. It sheds light on Al-e Ahmad’s personal life and seems to me to demythologize his personality a bit. Because, for example, Al-e Ahmad is known not to have had children with Simin Daneshvar, and before reading the book, I knew that he really did have some kind of pride, some idealistic thoughts, like he seemed too accomplished as a man to leave offspring, or something like that. And in Hamid Dabashi’s book there are some personal discussions between him and Daneshvar, which in my opinion should not have been published, at least in English. These facts were found in a diary, which was published by Ahmad’s brother who was somehow also in a conflict with Al-e Ahmad’s wife. So the wife didn’t want this diary to be published, but it was published, it was printed by the author’s brother there are some things, which, as I said, demythologize. 

But nevertheless, I can say, and I think it’s known by several people that Al-e Ahmad is accused by the mute of sickening people’s minds with this idea of turning in on himself. So I really do know someone who makes such accusations. I have an article about Al-e Ahmad, about westernization. And when I sent the article to an Iranian who lives in Canada, and he was very disappointed with what he read and he told me that basically Al-e Ahmad is guilty for what happened after the Revolution. So there is this opinion that if it wasn’t for Al-e Ahmad maybe what happened wouldn’t have happened. I don’t know what to say. Things are very complex, it’s hard to say how we should relate to that person or his influence.

It seems to me that young Iranians, from what I know, or young intellectuals, from what I’ve read, are well aware of the pre-revolutionary period, but they are more interested in their own problems. So, for example, on zoom, there are more discussions in the Western space, and I remember another writer of that period, and an exegete, talking about the limits or a kind of censorship on sexuality in Iranian prose today. Looking at such things, it seems to me that Iranians, even if they are interested in their past, today they are looking for change in the present or the future, not in the past. The past must be known, but today’s problems are pressing and they are rather looking for solutions to today’s problems. So he was referring to the fact that because not much is written in culture and literature about sexuality, at some point we end up not even being able to talk about it. So that suggests very strong social control, if sexuality is a taboo subject.

Ion Josan: I have another question about Martin Heidegger’s influence on Iranian thinkers. As we know, Fardid was among the first to relate very strongly to Heidegger’s work, and there is a Fardid circle in which Al-e Ahmad participates. And do you think that Al-e Ahmad reaches Heidegger through Fardid? Do you think he has a deep understanding of Heidegger? Or is he just picking up ideas from Fardid?

Vladimir Mitev: Occidentosis is a notion first used by Fardid. Probably everyone gives it his own interpretation. As far as I know, Fardid was generally referring even to the influence of ancient Greece on Iranian thought. My interpretation of the concept of Westernization, as I said in Cluj-Napoca and as I say now, is a bit different. It seems more practical to me. I associate it with trauma. But basically overcoming trauma does not mean destroying the West. It even means the ability to connect to the West in a more productive sense, let’s say. And, of course, you ask me about Fardid. I had the opportunity to interview another Heideggerian from Iran called Reza Davari. I don’t know if you read the interview, but there you keep seeing this idea about a primordial truth – the absolute. So I came to this interview with Davari by writing an article in which I put the ideas of Soroush, who is a kind of Iranian Sorosist, against the ideas of Davari – who is a kind of Heideggerian – and there I constructed things in such a way that I show that Davari is too much interested in absolute things, absolute truth, and there is constantly a negation between absolute truth and the ordinary man, and Soroush works rather with relative things, so he knows that we can never know the complete truth. Soroush simply believes that we must make our society as good as we can. So it’s a democratic idea. That’s why Soroush is said to be a religious democrat, or at least it’s tried to be presented that way.

There are documentaries about Fardid. As far as I know, the BBC has made documentaries. If you search on YouTube, I think you can find some interesting documentaries. I think I’ve tried to watch some of them. But I didn’t really extract much from what I saw and it seems to me that Fardid was less refined.

Ion Josan: Yes, that’s the phases – Fardid, Al-e Ahmad and Davari, and the last one has a more refined system.

Vladimir Mitev: There’s an article I think I read in Deutsche Welle about when Habermas arrived in Tehran, and maybe you’ve also read about their meeting and the public discussions they had. Davari criticized something in Habermas’ view of modernity, which is this aspect of modernity, this idea of being a kind of computer. He criticized the technocratic aspect of modernity. And perhaps here can be a starting point for understanding Iran. So what is taking place during the Revolution can also be seen as a kind of populism – a kind of revolt against technocrats. Iran still has technocrats today. Hassan Rouhani is the example of the proverbial technocrat.

Ion Josan: And we are now dealing with the bureaucratization of Howzei-type religious institutions. So where is the authenticity? A good part of the theological seminaries have become a kind of school that produces bureaucrats for the current system.

Vladimir Mitev: I don’t know about religious things, but it seems to me that, as far as clerics are concerned, this resembles the nomenclature of socialism. So even Bulgaria had people who called themselves that with this category of nomenclature, so it’s a kind of ruling elite from which it’s very difficult to fall. You are born into it and you die in it. Of course, if you do some stupid things you’ll be knocked down a few rungs in the system. I’m talking about nomenclature. As for Iran, I don’t know the situation well, but there are people who are tied to the party and who rely on the trust of power. And maybe that’s kind of a resemblance to the system that we had.

Marius Lazăr: It has become like that, a kind of Stefan Gheorghiu academy. It’s a school for party cadres. Good Vladimir. Anything else you want to tell us?

Vladimir Mitev: I think I’ve tired you.

Marius Lazar: You didn’t tire us. It’s just that we are, at least I am, I don’t know the subject very well, I’m a bit inhibited, but the discussions were really very Iranian, let’s say. I mean very full and very consistent discussions of ideas. And I think that in our intellectual and cultural space we should have this kind of discussion much more often and, above all, try to decipher and bring to light whole pieces of extra-European cultures that are very little known, at least in Romania. As far as I know, discussions about non-European cultures are only in their infancy, and we are not only talking about the Middle East, but also about other regions, India, China, the African space. Obviously there are studies, there are passionate people and researchers, there are research centres that are trying to catch up, but nevertheless we, at least in this part of Eastern Europe, still have a huge handicap of Eastern Oriental studies. Compared to other countries that already have hundreds of years of traditions, of journals and publications, of research centres and this kind of presentation like yours. They are first of all very interesting, but above all they are very useful. Diana thanks us too. Viviana, do you have anything else to say?

Viviana Movileanu: Yes, I would add something. Yes in addition to the presentation, if I may. About this split between East and West. Well, I feel a rift, in a way. It seems that we should get closer to the East. I was thinking about these funding possibilities through the Horizon Europe programme and the vision of the Commission of the European Commissioners to bring us closer through structural funds, these are two pillars. The third one I haven’t understood until today. From Horizon Europe there are the Marie Curie actions which I think you know very well, which have changed recently – of the five funding schemes, I see two with a greater possibility. I think Vladimir, if he’s a PhD student, could probably apply after he completes his PhD. Then there are the doctoral schools that are done in consortia, which Cluj, as far as I understand, has a better grasp of as a funding tool. This is how I see things from Bucharest, where we could, together, try to build something with these partners from the Near East. It is an idea, what I am saying now is just an idea.

Marius Lazăr: Related to Iran. The problem is that, unfortunately, at the moment Iran is under a set of sanctions, so it is a bit complicated to make collaborations. They exist, but purely academic, scientific collaborations, yes, it is possible at institutional level. And we have an agreement, as far as I know, with the University of Tehran. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to attract partners from Iran in projects with financial backing because they have problems with their fund management programme towards Iran and this blocks a lot of possibilities in the future. I was thinking, hoping, what can I say, that the political trajectory of relations between Iran and the West is so present.

Viviana Movileanu: West is generous.

Marius Lazăr: I think generous and pressing. And I think of this very sophisticated dialectic of Iran’s relations with the West. The epic continues to this day. And let’s hope that a solution will be found – that there will be political and diplomatic solutions cleverly enough. And from the Iranian side, first of all, and from the West to unblock relations. Because there is infinite potential for cooperation with Iran in an enormous number of areas. Iran has a lot to give to humanity. And we have a lot to know about Iranian culture, about everything related to Iran. So much for me.

Viviana Movileanu: That’s all I wanted to say, maybe in the future.

Vladimir Mitev: Can I say something?

Marius Lazăr: Sure, Vladimir.

Vladimir Mitev: About the break-up/rift. I keep seeing that. But you should know that there is a rift, in a sense, between Romania and Bulgaria too. So, obviously, I would say that there are different spaces of knowledge, and here I’m really not talking about the state or security bodies and so on. There are simply different areas of knowledge, and each area has its own priorities or directions of development and so on. I simply, being as I say, I without a border between Romania and Bulgaria, at least culturally, but I think in many other senses as well, I am struggling because there is not enough dynamic, at least if we look at the press, for example, I see that there is not much interest in the national press in Bulgaria from the national press in Romania or vice versa.

So I even said that the Friendship Bridge, which is the name of my blog, is actually a bridge between realities that most likely will stand on their own shore. The bridge, of course, will contribute to a certain exchange. Something will be accelerated on the bridge and will reach the other side. But rather each will stay on its own bank. Or at least that’s the way it seems to me about Iran. It seems to me that Iran is a country that is very careful about its external relations. I’ve been reading for some time what some websites, online groups in Iran are writing about international relations and I see that indeed Marius was right, too much is thought of from the perspective of a centre, either simply as a country that does not this perspective that I, for example, have, that is to do something cross-border. Let there be maybe even more openness in some senses to people you may not even know. Simply put, it seems to me to be a very outward-looking country and I don’t see that changing any time soon. And because of this, it seems to me that the hypothesis, at least the idea of the friendship bridge, can be a framework for intercultural relations. Simply put, everyone remains what they want. There is no question of overnight changes in inter-cultural relations, but on the other hand, it seems to me that globalisation and the world we live in inevitably push us towards openness. So we should look for some kind of balance between openness and some kind of respect for the simple fact that people may not want to do anything more than that.

On scientific collaborations. I am open to discussions, even by being in Cluj-Napoca. I was here earlier this month. I look very positively at the fact that I am initiated in some Romanian circles, and if I refer to myself, the answer is easy to give. But if I have to work through some institutions that are always a bit conservative, we have to see how it will happen. In fact, I don’t know how it is done. It has to be a good idea, and when I have a good idea in mind, then I can do a lot. That’s what I’ve already seen in practice.

Marius Lazăr: Anyway, we’ll see you in Cluj. Let’s see in the autumn if we can find more consistent collaboration formulas. And we look forward to seeing you. So much for today.

Photo: A part of the poster for the seminar (source: Facebook)

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